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Abstract
Fictitious play is a simple and widely studied adaptive heuristic for
playing repeated games. It is well known that fictitious play fails to
be Hannan consistent. Several variants of fictitious play including re-
gret matching, generalized regret matching and smooth fictitious play, are
known to be Hannan consistent. In this note, we consider sampled ficti-
tious play: at each round, the player samples past times and plays the best
response to previous moves of other players at the sampled time points.
We show that sampled fictitious play, using Bernoulli sampling, is Hannan
consistent. Unlike several existing Hannan consistency proofs that rely on
concentration of measure results, ours instead uses anti-concentration re-
sults from Littlewood-Offord theory.
Keywords: adaptive heuristics, learning, repeated games, Hannan consistency,
fictitious play
1 Introduction
In the setting of repeated games played in discrete time, the (unconditional)
regret of a player, at any time point, is the difference between the payoffs she
would have received had she played the best, in hindsight, constant strategy
throughout, and the payoffs she did in fact receive. Hannan [1957] showed
the existence of procedures with a “no-regret” property: procedures for which
the average regret per time goes to zero for a large number of time points. His
procedure was a simple modification of fictitious play: random perturbations are
added to the cumulative payoffs of every strategy so far and the player picks the
strategy with the largest perturbed cumulative payoff. No regret procedures are
also called “universally consistent” [Fudenberg and Levine, 1998, Section 4.7] or
“Hannan consistent” [Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi, 2006, Section 4.2].
It is well known that smoothing the cumulative payoffs before computing
the best response is crucial to achieve Hannan consistency. One way to achieve
smoothness is through stochastic smoothing, or adding perturbations. Without
perturbations, the procedure becomes identical to fictitious play, which fails to
be Hannan consistent [Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi, 2006, Exercise 3.8]. Besides
Hannan’s modification, other variants of fictitious play are also known to be
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Hannan consistent, including (unconditional) regret matching, generalized (un-
conditional) regret matching and smooth fictitious play (for an overview, see
Hart and Mas-Colell [2013, Section 10.9]).
In this note, we consider another variant of fictitious play, namely sampled
fictitious play. Here, the player samples past time points using some (random-
ized) sampling scheme and plays the best response to the moves of the other
players restricted to the set of sampled time points. Sampled fictitious play has
been considered by other authors in different contexts. Kaniovski and Young
[1995] established convergence to Nash equilibrium in 2×2 games. Gilliland and Jung
[2006] provided regret bounds for the game of matching pennies. Lambert III et al.
[2005] considered games with identical payoffs for all players and use sampled
fictitious play to solve large-scale optimization problems. To the best of our
knowledge, it is not known whether sampled fictitious play is Hannan consis-
tent without making any assumptions on the form of the game and payoffs. The
purpose of this note is to show that it is indeed Hannan consistent when used
with a natural sampling scheme, namely Bernoulli sampling.
2 Preliminaries
Consider a game in strategic form where M is the number of players, Si is the
set of strategies for player i, and ui :
∏M
j=1 Si → R is the payoff function for
player i. For simplicity assume that the payoff functions of all players are [−1, 1]
bounded. We also assume the number of pure strategies is the same for each
player and that Si = {1, . . . , N}. Let S =
∏M
i=1 Si be the set of M -tuples of
player strategies. For s = (si)
M
i=1 ∈ S, we denote the strategies of players other
than i by s−i = (sj)1≤j≤M,j 6=i.
The game is played repeatedly over (discrete) time t = 1, 2, . . .. A learning
procedure for player i is a procedure that maps the history ht−1 = (sτ )t−1τ=1
of plays just prior to time t, to a strategy st,i ∈ Si. The learning procedure
is allowed to be randomized, i.e., player i has access to a stream of random
variables ǫ1, ǫ2, . . . and she is allowed to use ǫ1, . . . , ǫt−1, in addition to ht−1, to
choose st,i. Player i’s regret at time t is defined as
Rt,i = max
k∈Si
t∑
τ=1
ui(k, sτ,−i)−
t∑
τ=1
ui(sτ ).
This compares the player’s cumulative payoff with the payoff she could have re-
ceived had she selected the best constant (over time) strategy k with knowledge
of the other players’ moves.
A learning procedure for player i is said to be Hannan consistent if and only
if
lim sup
t→∞
Rt,i
t
≤ 0 almost surely.
Hannan consistency is also known as the “no-regret” property and as “universal
consistency”. The term “universal” refers to the fact that the regret per time
goes to zero irrespective of what the other players do.
Fictitious play is a (deterministic) learning procedure where player i plays
2
the best response to the plays of the other players so far. That is,
st,i ∈ arg max
k∈{1,...,N}
t−1∑
τ=1
ui(k, sτ,−i). (1)
As mentioned earlier, fictitious play is not Hannan consistent. However, consider
the following modification of fictitious play, called sampled fictitious play. At
time t, player randomly selects a subset St ⊆ {1, . . . , t − 1} of previous time
points and plays the best response to the other players’ moves only over St.
That is,
st,i ∈ arg max
k∈{1,...,N}
∑
τ∈St
ui(k, sτ,−i). (2)
If multiple strategies achieve the maximum, then the tie is broken uniformly at
random, and independently with respect to all previous randomness. Also, if St
turns out to be empty (an event that happens with probability exactly 2−(t−1)
under the Bernoulli sampling described below), we adopt the convention that
the argmax above includes all N strategies.
In this note, we consider Bernoulli sampling, i.e., any particular round
τ ∈ {1, . . . , t − 1} is included in St independently with probability 1/2 . More
specifically, if ǫ
(t)
1 , . . . , ǫ
(t)
t−1 are i.i.d. symmetric Bernoulli (or Rademacher) ran-
dom variables taking values in {−1,+1}, then
St = {τ ∈ {1, . . . , t− 1} : ǫ(t)τ = +1} (3)
and therefore,
∑
τ∈St
ui(k, sτ,−i) =
t−1∑
τ=1
(1 + ǫ
(t)
τ )
2
ui(k, sτ,−i).
Note that the procedure defined by the combination of (2) and (3) is completely
parameter free, i.e., there is no tuning parameter that has to be carefully tuned
in order to obtain desired convergence properties.
3 Result and Discussion
Our main result is the following.
Theorem 3.1. Sampled fictitious play (2) with Bernoulli sampling (3) is Han-
nan consistent.
Before we move on to the proof, a few remarks are in order.
Computational tractability It is a simple but important observation that
the form of the optimization problem solved by fictitious play (1) is exactly the
same as the optimization problem solved by sampled fictitious play (2). This
can be very useful when the player has a large strategy set and does not want
to enumerate all strategies to solve the maximization involved in both fictitious
play and its sampled version. For example, Lambert III et al. [2005] describe
their computational experience with sampled fictitious play in the context of a
dynamic traffic assignment problem.
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Rate of convergence Our proof gives the rate of convergence of (expected)
average regret as O(N2
√
log log t/t) where the constant hidden in O(·) nota-
tion is small and explicit. It is known that the optimal rate is O(
√
logN/t)
[Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi, 2006, Section 2.10]. Therefore, our rate of conver-
gence is almost optimal in t but severely suboptimal in N . This raises several
interesting questions. What is the best bound possible for Sampled Fictitious
Play with Bernoulli sampling? Is there a sampling scheme for which Sampled
Fictitious Play procedure achieves the optimal rate of convergence? The first
question is partially answered by Theorem B.1 in Appendix B which states
that the dependency on N is likely to be polynomial instead of logarithmical,
but there is still some gap between the lower bound and the upper bound we
provide.
Asymmetric probabilities Instead of using symmetric Bernoulli probabil-
ities, we can choose ǫ
(t)
τ such that P (ǫ
(t)
τ = +1) = α. As α → 1, the learning
procedure becomes fictitious play and as α → 0, it selects strategies uniformly
at random. Therefore, it is natural to expect that the regret bound will blow up
near the two extremes of α = 1 and α = 0. We can make this intuition precise,
but only for {−1, 0, 1}-valued payoffs (instead of [−1, 1]-valued). For details, see
Appendix C in the supplementary material.
Follow the perturbed leader Note that
arg max
k∈{1,...,N}
t−1∑
τ=1
(1 + ǫ
(t)
τ )
2
ui(k, sτ,−i) = arg max
k∈{1,...,N}
( t−1∑
τ=1
ui(k, sτ,−i)+
t−1∑
τ=1
ǫ(t)τ ui(k, sτ,−i)
)
.
Therefore, we can think of sampled fictitious play as adding a random per-
turbation to the expression that fictitious play optimizes. Such algorithms are
referred to as “follow the perturbed leader” (FPL) in the computer science lit-
erature (“fictitious play” is known as “follow the leader”). This family was
originally proposed by Hannan [1957] and popularized by Kalai and Vempala
[2005]. Closer to this paper are the FPL algorithms of Devroye et al. [2013]
and van Erven et al. [2014]. However, none of these papers considered sampled
fictitious play.
Extension to conditional (or internal) regret In this paper we focus on
unconditional (or external) regret. Other notions of regret, especially condi-
tional (or internal) regret can also be considered. Internal regret measures the
worst regret, over N(N − 1) choices of k 6= k′, of the form “every time strategy
k was picked, strategy k′ should have been picked instead”. There are generic
conversions [Stoltz and Lugosi, 2005, Blum and Mansour, 2007] that will con-
vert any learning procedure with small external regret to one with small internal
regret. These conversion, however, require access to the probability distribution
over strategies at each time point. This probability distribution can be ap-
proximated, to arbitrary accuracy, by making the choice of the strategy in (2)
multiple times each time selecting the random subset St independently. How-
ever, doing so and using a generic conversion from external to internal regret
will lead to a cumbersome overall algorithm. It will be nicer to design a simpler
sampling based learning procedure with small internal regret.
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4 Proof of the Main Result
We break the proof of our main result into several steps. The first and third
steps involve fairly standard arguments in this area. Our main innovations are
in step two.
4.1 Step 1: From Regret to Switching Probabilities
In this step, we assume that players other than player i (the “opponents”) are
oblivious, i.e., they do not adapt to what player i does. Mathematically, this
means that the sequence st,−i does not depend on the moves st,i of player i.
We will prove a uniform regret bound that holds for all deterministic payoff
sequences {st,−i}Tt=1, by which we can conclude that the same bound holds for
oblivious but random payoff sequences as well. Since player i is fixed for the rest
of the proof, we will not carry the index i in our notation further. Let the vector
gt ∈ [−1, 1]N be defined as gt,k = ui(k, st,−i) for k ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Moreover, we
denote player i’s move st,i as kt. With this notation, regret at time T equals
RT = max
k∈{1,...,N}
T∑
t=1
gt,k −
T∑
t=1
gt,kt .
In this step, we will look at the expected regret. Because the opponents are
oblivious, this equals
E [RT ] = max
k∈{1,...,N}
T∑
t=1
gt,k − E
[
T∑
t=1
gt,kt
]
= max
k∈{1,...,N}
T∑
t=1
gt,k −
T∑
t=1
E [gt,kt ] .
Recall that
kt ∈ arg max
k∈{1,...,N}
t−1∑
τ=1
(1 + ǫ
(t)
τ )
2
gτ,k.
Since gt’s are fixed vectors, by independence we see that the distribution of kt
is exactly the same whether or not we share the Rademacher random vari-
ables across time points. Therefore, we do not have to draw a fresh sam-
ple ǫ
(t)
1 , . . . , ǫ
(t)
t−1 at time t. Instead, we fix a single stream ǫ1, ǫ2, . . . of i.i.d.
Rademacher random variables and set (ǫ
(t)
1 , . . . , ǫ
(t)
t−1) = (ǫ1, . . . , ǫt−1) for all t.
With this reduction in number of random variables used, we now have
kt ∈ arg max
k∈{1,...,N}
t−1∑
τ=1
(1 + ǫτ )gτ,k. (4)
We define Gt =
∑t
τ=1 gτ , the cumulative payoff vector at time t. Define
g˜t = (1 + ǫt)gt and G˜t =
∑t
τ=1 g˜τ . We also define
gt,i⊖j = gt,i − gt,j , g˜t,i⊖j = g˜t,i − g˜t,j.
With these definitions, we have
G˜t,i⊖j = G˜t,i − G˜t,j =
t∑
τ=1
g˜τ,i −
t∑
τ=1
g˜τ,j
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=t∑
τ=1
(1 + ǫτ )(gτ,i − gτ,j) =
t∑
τ=1
(1 + ǫτ )gτ,i⊖j .
The following result upper bounds the regret in terms of downward zero-crossings
of the process G˜t,i⊖j , i.e., the times t when it switches from being non-negative
at time t− 1 to non-positive at time t.
Theorem 4.1. We have the following upper bound on the expected regret:
E [RT ] ≤ 2N2 max
1≤i,j≤N
T∑
t=1
|gt,i⊖j |P
(
G˜t−1,i⊖j ≥ 0, G˜t,i⊖j ≤ 0
)
.
The proof of this theorem can be found in Appendix A. We now focus on
bounding the switching probabilities for a fixed pair i, j.
4.2 Step 2: Bounding Switching Probabilities Using Littlewood-
Offord Theory
Our strategy is to do a “multi-scale” analysis and, within each scale, apply
Littlewood-Offord theory to bound the switching probabilities. The need for a
multi-scale argument arises from the requirement in Littlewood-Offord theorem
(see Theorem 4.2 below) for a lower bound on the step sizes of random walks.
We partition the set of T time points [T ] := {1, . . . , T } into K + 1 disjoint sets
at different scales, denoted as {Ak}Kk=0 where
Ak =


{t ∈ [T ] : |gt,i⊖j | ≤ 1√
T
} k = 0
{t ∈ [T ] : T− 12k < |gt,i⊖j | ≤ T−
1
2k+1 } k = 1, . . . ,K − 1
{t ∈ [T ] : T− 12K < |gt,i⊖j | ≤ 2} k = K
.
Note that actually Ak depends on i, j as well but for the sake of clarity we drop
this dependence in the notation. The cardinality of a finite set A will be denoted
by |A|. The number K + 1 of different scales is determined by
K = argmin{k ∈ N : T− 12k ≥ 1/2}.
∀t, i, gt,i ∈ [−1, 1] so |gt,i⊖j| ∈ [0, 2]. The scales here are chosen such that K is
not very large (of order O
(
log log(T )
)
) and still covers the entire range of the
payoffs. It easily follows that,
T∑
t=1
|gt,i⊖j |P
(
G˜t−1,i⊖j ≥ 0, G˜t,i⊖j ≤ 0
)
=
T∑
t=1
|gt,i⊖j |P
(
t−1∑
τ=1
ǫτgτ,i⊖j ≥ −
t−1∑
τ=1
gτ,i⊖j ,
t∑
τ=1
ǫτgτ,i⊖j ≤ −
t∑
τ=1
gτ,i⊖j
)
=
K∑
k=0
∑
t∈Ak
|gt,i⊖j|P
(
t−1∑
τ=1
ǫτgτ,i⊖j ≥ −
t−1∑
τ=1
gτ,i⊖j,
t∑
τ=1
ǫτgτ,i⊖j ≤ −
t∑
τ=1
gτ,i⊖j
)
.
We now want to argue that the probabilities involved above are small. The cru-
cial observation is that, if a switch occurs, then the random sum
∑t
τ=1 ǫτgτ,i⊖j
has to lie in a sufficiently small interval. Such “small ball” probabilities are
exactly what the classic Littlewood-Offord theorem controls.
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Theorem 4.2 (Littlewood-Offord Theorem of Erdo¨s, Theorem 3 of Erdo˝s
[1945]). Let x1, . . . , xn be n real numbers such that |xi| ≥ 1 for all i. For
any given radius ∆ > 0, the small ball probability satisfies
sup
B
P (ǫ1x1 + · · ·+ ǫnxn ∈ B) ≤ S(n)
2n
(⌊∆⌋+ 1)
where ǫ1, . . . , ǫn are i.i.d. Rademacher random variables, B ranges over all
closed balls (intervals) of radius ∆, and ⌊x⌋ refers to the integral part of x,
S(n) is the largest binomial coefficient belonging to n.
Using elementary calculations to upper bound S(n)2n gives us the following
corollary.
Corollary 4.2.1. Under the same notation and conditions as Theorem 4.2, we
have
sup
B
P (ǫ1x1 + · · ·+ ǫnxn ∈ B) ≤ CLO(⌊∆⌋+ 1) 1√
n
where CLO =
2
√
2e
π
< 3.
The proof of this corollary can be found in Appendix A.
The scale of payoffs for time periods in A0 is so small that we do not need
any Littlewood-Offord theory to control their contribution to the regret. Simply
bounding the probabilities by 1 gives us the following.
Theorem 4.3. The following upper bound holds for switching probabilities for
time periods within A0:
∑
t∈A0
|gt,i⊖j |P
(
t−1∑
τ=1
ǫτgτ,i⊖j ≥ −
t−1∑
τ=1
gτ,i⊖j ,
t∑
τ=1
ǫτgτ,i⊖j ≤ −
t∑
τ=1
gτ,i⊖j
)
≤
√
|A0| ≤ 20CLO
√
|A0|.
where CLO > 1.
The proof of this theorem can also be found in Appendix A.
The real work lies in controlling the switching probabilities for payoffs at
intermediate scales. The idea in the proof of the results is to condition on the
ǫt’s outside Ak. Then the probability of interest is written as a small ball event
in terms of the ǫt’s in Ak. Applying Littlewood-Offord theorem concludes the
argument.
Theorem 4.4. For any k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, we have
∑
t∈Ak
|gt,i⊖j |P
(
t−1∑
τ=1
ǫτgτ,i⊖j ≥ −
t−1∑
τ=1
gτ,i⊖j ,
t∑
τ=1
ǫτgτ,i⊖j ≤ −
t∑
τ=1
gτ,i⊖j
)
≤ 20CLO
√
|Ak|.
Again, the proof of this theorem is deferred to Appendix A.
We finally have all the ingredients in place to control the switching proba-
bilities.
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Corollary 4.4.1. The following upper bound on the switching probabilities
holds.
T∑
t=1
|gt,i⊖j|P
(
t−1∑
τ=1
ǫτgτ,i⊖j ≥ −
t−1∑
τ=1
gτ,i⊖j ,
t∑
τ=1
ǫτgτ,i⊖j ≤ −
t∑
τ=1
gτ,i⊖j
)
≤ 20CLO
√
T log2(4 log2 T ).
Proof. Using Theorem 4.3 and Theorem 4.4, we have
T∑
t=1
|gt,i⊖j |P
(
t−1∑
τ=1
ǫτgτ,i⊖j ≥ −
t−1∑
τ=1
gτ,i⊖j,
t∑
τ=1
ǫτgτ,i⊖j ≤ −
t∑
τ=1
gτ,i⊖j
)
=
K∑
k=0
∑
t∈Ak
|gt,i⊖j |P
(
t−1∑
τ=1
ǫτgτ,i⊖j ≥ −
t−1∑
τ=1
gτ,i⊖j ,
t∑
τ=1
ǫτgτ,i⊖j ≤ −
t∑
τ=1
gτ,i⊖j
)
≤
K∑
k=0
20CLO
√
|Ak|.
Since
∑K
k=0
√
|Ak| ≤
√
K + 1 ·
√∑K
k=0 |Ak| and
∑K
k=0 |Ak| = T , we have
K∑
k=0
20CLO
√
|Ak| ≤ 20CLO
√
(K + 1)T .
By definition of K, we have that T−
1
2K−1 < 12 , K ≤ log2(log2(T )) + 1 which
finishes the proof.
Thus, ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N, i 6= j}, we have
T∑
t=1
|gt,i⊖j |P
(
G˜t−1,i⊖j ≥ 0, G˜t,i⊖j ≤ 0
)
≤ 20CLO
√
T log2(4 log2 T ),
which, when plugged into Theorem 4.1, immediately yields the following corol-
lary.
Corollary 4.4.2. Against an oblivious opponent, both versions — the single
stream version (4) and the fresh-randomization-at-each-round version (2) — of
sampled fictitious play enjoy the following bound on the expected regret.
E [RT ] ≤ 40CLON2
√
T log2(4 log2 T ).
4.3 Step 3: From Oblivious to Adaptive Opponents
Now we consider adaptive opponents. In this setting, we can no longer assume
that player i plays against a fixed sequence of payoff vectors {gt}Tt=1. Note
that gt,k is just shorthand for ui(k, st,−i) and opponents can react to player i’s
moves k1, . . . , kt−1 in selecting their strategy tuple st,−i, possibly making use of
their own private randomness. We denote all randomness used collectively by
other players over all time periods by ω which is drawn from some probability
space Ω. Thus, gt is a function gt(k1, . . . , kt−1, ω). Faced with general adaptive
opponents, the single stream version (4) can incur terrible expected regret as
stated below.
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Theorem 4.5. The single stream version of the sampled fictitious play proce-
dure (4) can incur linear expected regret against adaptive opponents.
The proof of this theorem can be found at the end of Appendix A.
However, for the fresh randomness at each round procedure (2), we can ap-
ply Lemma 4.1 of Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi [2006] along with Corollary 4.4.2 to
derive our next result that holds for adaptive opponents too. There are two
conditions that we must verify before we apply that lemma. First, the learning
procedure should use independent randomization at different time points. Sec-
ond, the probability distribution of st,i over the N available strategies should
be fully determined by s1,−i, . . . , st−1,−i and should not depend explicitly on
player i own previous moves s1,i, . . . , st−1,i. Both of these conditions are easily
seen to hold for sampled fictitious play as defined in (2) and (3). Also note
that Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi [2006] consider deterministic adaptive opponents
in their Lemma 4.1. The extension to our case is easy: we first get a high proba-
bility (w.r.t. player i’s randomness) regret bound for the deterministic adaptive
opponent gt(k1, . . . , kt−1, ω) for a fixed ω. Since the bound holds for every ω
and does not depend on ω, the same high probability bound is true when ω is
drawn from Ω. This leads us to our final result.
Theorem 4.6. For any T, for any δT > 0, with probability at least 1− δT , the
actual regret RT of sampled fictitious play as defined in (2) and (3) satisfies,
for any adaptive opponent,
RT ≤ 40CLON2
√
T log2(4 log2 T ) +
√
T
2
log
1
δT
.
Now pick δT =
1
T 2
. Consider the eventsET = {RT ≥ 12CLON2
√
T log2(4 log2 T )+√
T logT} with P (ET ) ≤ δT . Since
∑∞
T=1 δT <∞, we have
∑∞
T=1 P (ET ) <∞.
Therefore, using Borel-Cantelli lemma, the event “infinitely many ET ’s occur”
has probability 0. That is, with probability 1, we have lim supT→∞
RT
T log T ≤ C
for some constant C. In particular, with probability 1, lim supT→∞
RT
T
= 0,
which proves Theorem 3.1.
5 Conclusion
We proved that a natural variant of fictitious play is Hannan consistent. In
the variant we considered, the player plays the best response to moves of her
opponents at sampled time points in the history so far. We considered one
particular sampling scheme, namely Bernoulli sampling. It will be interesting
to consider other sampling strategies including sampling with replacement. It
will also be interesting to consider notions of regret, such as tracking regret
[Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi, 2006, Section 5.2], that are more suitable for non-
stationary environments by biasing the sampling to give more importance to
recent time points.
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Appendix A Proofs
We first present a lemma that helps us in proving Theorem 4.1.
Lemma A.1. Let kt and g˜t be defined as in (4) and the text following that
equation. We have,
T∑
t=1
g˜t,kt+1 ≥
T∑
t=1
g˜t,kT+1 = max
k∈{1,...,N}
T∑
t=1
g˜t,k.
Proof. This is a classical lemma, for example, see Lemma 3.1 in [Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi,
2006]. We follow the same idea, i.e, proving through induction but adapt it to
handle gains instead of losses. The statement is obvious for T = 1. Assume now
that
T−1∑
t=1
g˜t,kt+1 ≥
T−1∑
t=1
g˜t,kT .
Since, by definition,
∑T−1
t=1 g˜t,kT ≥
∑T−1
t=1 g˜t,kT+1 , the inductive assumption im-
plies
T−1∑
t=1
g˜t,kt+1 ≥
T−1∑
t=1
g˜t,kT+1 .
Add g˜T,kT+1 to both sides to obtain the result.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. We will prove a result for Bernoulli sampling with gen-
eral probabilities, i.e., when P (ǫt = +1) = α where α is not necessarily 1/2. We
will show that
E [RT ] ≤ N
2
α
max
1≤i,j≤N
T∑
t=1
|gt,i⊖j|P
(
G˜t−1,i⊖j ≥ 0, G˜t,i⊖j ≤ 0
)
from which the theorem follows as a special case when α = 1/2.
Obviously we have E(g˜t,i) = 2αgt,i because of the fact that E(ǫt) = 2α− 1.
Furthermore, E[g˜t,kt |ǫ1, . . . , ǫt−1] = 2αgt,kt because kt is fully determined by
past randomness ǫ1, . . . , ǫt−1 and past payoffs g1, . . . , gt−1 that are given. This
implies that E[g˜t,kt ] = E [E[g˜t,kt |ǫ1, . . . , ǫt−1]] = 2αE[gt,kt ]. We now have,
E [RT ] = max
k∈{1,...,N}
T∑
t=1
gt,k − E
[
T∑
t=1
gt,kt
]
=
1
2α
max
k∈{1,...,N}
E
[
T∑
t=1
g˜t,k
]
− 1
2α
E
[
T∑
t=1
g˜t,kt
]
≤ 1
2α
E
[
max
k∈{1,...,N}
T∑
t=1
g˜t,k −
T∑
t=1
g˜t,kt
]
.
Using Lemma A.1, we can further upper bound the last expression as follows,
E [RT ] ≤ 1
2α
E
[
T∑
t=1
g˜t,kt+1 −
T∑
t=1
g˜t,kt
]
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=
1
2α
T∑
t=1
E
[
(1 + ǫt)(gt,kt+1 − gt,kt)
]
≤ 1
2α
T∑
t=1
E
[
(1 + ǫt)|gt,kt+1 − gt,kt |
]
≤ 1
α
T∑
t=1
E
[|gt,kt − gt,kt+1 |]
=
1
α
T∑
t=1
∑
1≤i,j≤N
E
[|gt,i − gt,j|1(kt=i,kt+1=j)]
=
1
α
∑
1≤i,j≤N
T∑
t=1
E
[|gt,i − gt,j|1(kt=i,kt+1=j)]
≤ N
2
α
max
1≤i,j≤N
T∑
t=1
|gt,i − gt,j|P (kt = i, kt+1 = j)
≤ N
2
α
max
1≤i,j≤N
T∑
t=1
|gt,i − gt,j|P
(
G˜t−1,i ≥ G˜t−1,j , G˜t,i ≤ G˜t,j
)
=
N2
α
max
1≤i,j≤N
T∑
t=1
|gt,i⊖j |P
(
G˜t−1,i⊖j ≥ 0, G˜t,i⊖j ≤ 0
)
.
The next lemma is useful to determine the appropriate constant in the
Littlewood-Offord Theorem.
Lemma A.2. Suppose X1, . . . , Xt are i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables that
take value of 1 with probability α and 0 with probability 1−α. If t > max( 21−α , 2α ) ≥
max( 2α1−α ,
2
α
), then for all k,
P
(
t∑
i=1
Xi = k
)
≤ e
2π
×
√
2
α(1− α) × t
− 12 .
Proof. Note that for 0 ≤ k < t,
P (x = k + 1)
P (x = k)
=
(
t
k+1
)
αk+1(1 − α)t−k−1(
t
k
)
αk(1− α)t−k =
α(t− k)
(1− α)(k + 1) .
Therefore, the maximum probability of Bernoulli distribution P (X = k) is
achieved when k = kˆ = ⌊(t + 1)α⌋ where ⌊x⌋ denotes the integral part of x.
Clearly kˆ ∈ [tα− 1, (t+ 1)α]. Thus,√
kˆ(t− kˆ) ≥ min
(√
(tα− 1)(t− tα+ 1),
√
(t+ 1)α(t− tα− α)
)
= t×min
(√
(α− 1
t
)(1 − α+ 1
t
),
√
(1 +
1
t
)α(1 − α− α
t
)
)
≥ t×min
(√
(α− α
2
)(1 − α),
√
α(1 − α− 1− α
2
)
)
12
=√
α(1− α)
2
t.
With this preliminary inequality, we are ready to prove the lemma.
P (
t∑
i=1
Xi = k) ≤ P (
t∑
i=1
Xi = kˆ)
=
(
t
kˆ
)
× αkˆ(1− α)t−kˆ
=
t!
(kˆ)!(t− kˆ)! × α
kˆ(1− α)t−kˆ
≤ t
t+ 12 e1−t(√
2πkˆkˆ+
1
2 e−kˆ
)(√
2π(t− kˆ)t−kˆ+
1
2 e−(t−kˆ)
) × αkˆ(1− α)t−kˆ
=
e
2π
× 1√
kˆ(t− kˆ)
× t
t+ 12
kˆkˆ(t− kˆ)t−kˆ × α
kˆ(1 − α)t−kˆ
≤ e
2π
×
√
2
α(1 − α) × t
t− 12 × α
kˆ(1− α)t−kˆ
kˆkˆ(t− kˆ)t−kˆ
.
Let f(x) = α
x(1−α)t−x
xx(t−x)t−x , f
′(x) =
(
log( α1−α )− log( xt−x)
)
× f(x). Obviously f ′(x)
is 0 when x = αt, positive when x < αt, and negative when x > αt. Thus,
f(x) ≤ α
αt(1− α)t−αt
(αt)αt(t− αt)t−αt = t
−t.
Hence,
P (
t∑
i=1
Xi = a) ≤ e
2π
×
√
2
α(1 − α) × t
t− 12 × f(kˆ)
≤ e
2π
×
√
2
α(1 − α) × t
− 12 .
Proof of Corollary 4.2.1. Note that when α = 12 , Lemma A.2 provides a bound
on S(n)2n . Plug in α =
1
2 to Lemma A.2 and combine with Theorem 4.2, we know
that if n > 4, CLO =
√
2e
π
will suffice. If n ≤ 4, 2
√
2e
π
× n− 12 > 1 and Lemma
A.2 still holds.
Proof of Theorem 4.3. We write |A| to denote the cardinality of a finite set A.
∑
t∈A0
|gt,i⊖j |P (
t−1∑
τ=1
ǫτgτ,i⊖j ≥ −
t−1∑
τ=1
gτ,i⊖j ,
t∑
τ=1
ǫτgτ,i⊖j ≤ −
t∑
τ=1
gτ,i⊖j)
≤
∑
t∈A0
1√
T
× 1 = |A0|√
T
≤
√
|A0|.
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Proof of Theorem 4.4. We write ǫ with a subset of [T ] as subscript to denote
ǫt’s at times that are within the subset. For example, ǫ[T ] = {ǫ1, . . . , ǫT }. We
also write ǫ−A to denote the set of ǫt’s that are within the complement of A
with respect to [T ].
Case I: k ∈ {1, . . . ,K − 1}
∑
t∈Ak
|gt,i⊖j |P
(
t−1∑
τ=1
ǫτgτ,i⊖j ≥ −
t−1∑
τ=1
gτ,i⊖j,
t∑
τ=1
ǫτgτ,i⊖j ≤ −
t∑
τ=1
gτ,i⊖j
)
=
∑
t∈Ak
|gt,i⊖j |Eǫ[T ] [1(∑t−1τ=1 ǫτgτ,i⊖j≥−∑t−1τ=1 gτ,i⊖j ,∑tτ=1 ǫτgτ,i⊖j≤−∑tτ=1 gτ,i⊖j)]
=
∑
t∈Ak
|gt,i⊖j |Eǫ−Ak
[
EǫAk
[1(
∑t−1
τ=1 ǫτgτ,i⊖j≥−
∑t−1
τ=1 gτ,i⊖j ,
∑
t
τ=1 ǫτgτ,i⊖j≤−
∑
t
τ=1 gτ,i⊖j)
|ǫ−Ak ]
]
=Eǫ−Ak
[∑
t∈Ak
|gt,i⊖j |EǫAk [1(∑t−1τ=1 ǫτgτ,i⊖j≥−∑t−1τ=1 gτ,i⊖j ,∑tτ=1 ǫτgτ,i⊖j≤−∑tτ=1 gτ,i⊖j)|ǫ−Ak ]
]
≤ sup
ǫ−Ak
∑
t∈Ak
|gt,i⊖j |EǫAk [1(∑t−1τ=1 ǫτgτ,i⊖j≥−∑t−1τ=1 gτ,i⊖j ,∑tτ=1 ǫτgτ,i⊖j≤−∑tτ=1 gτ,i⊖j)|ǫ−Ak ].
Let Ak = {tk,1, . . . , tk,|Ak|} with elements listed in increasing order of time
index. Also, define
Dn = Dn(ǫ−Ak) = −
tk,n−1∑
τ=1,τ∈−Ak
(1 + ǫτ )gτ,i⊖j.
Then, we have∑
t∈Ak
|gt,i⊖j |EǫAk [1(∑t−1τ=1 ǫτgτ,i⊖j≥−∑t−1τ=1 gτ,i⊖j ,∑tτ=1 ǫτgτ,i⊖j≤−∑tτ=1 gτ,i⊖j)|ǫ−Ak ]
=
|Ak|∑
n=1
|gtk,n,i⊖j |EǫAk [1(∑n−1s=1 ǫtk,sgtk,s,i⊖j≥−∑n−1s=1 gtk,s,i⊖j+Dn,∑ns=1 ǫtk,sgs,i⊖j≤−∑ns=1 gtk,s,i⊖j+Dn)|ǫ−Ak ]
=
|Ak|∑
n=1
|gtk,n,i⊖j |P
(
n−1∑
s=1
ǫtk,sgtk,s,i⊖j ≥ −
n−1∑
s=1
gtk,s,i⊖j +Dn,
n∑
s=1
ǫtk,sgtk,s,i⊖j ≤ −
n∑
s=1
gtk,s,i⊖j +Dn
∣∣∣∣∣∣ǫ−Ak

 .
By definition of the set Ak, we have |gtk,s,i⊖j | ≥ T−
1
2k , so T
1
2k |gtk,s,i⊖j | ≥ 1.
Let Mk = T
1
2k . Then, we have
|Ak|∑
n=1
|gtk,n,i⊖j |P
(
n−1∑
s=1
ǫtk,sgtk,s,i⊖j ≥ −
n−1∑
s=1
gtk,s,i⊖j +Dn,
n∑
s=1
ǫtk,sgtk,s,i⊖j ≤ −
n∑
s=1
gtk,s,i⊖j +Dn
∣∣∣∣∣∣ǫ−Ak


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=|Ak|∑
n=1
|gtk,n,i⊖j |P
(
n−1∑
s=1
ǫtk,sgtk,s,i⊖jMk ≥ −
n−1∑
s=1
gtk,s,i⊖jMk +DnMk ,
n∑
s=1
ǫtk,sgtk,s,i⊖jMk ≤ −
n∑
s=1
gtk,s,i⊖jMk +DnMk
∣∣∣∣∣∣ǫ−Ak


≤
|Ak|∑
n=1
|gtk,n,i⊖j |P
(
n∑
s=1
ǫtk,sgtk,s,i⊖jMk ∈ Bk,n
∣∣∣∣∣ǫ−Ak
)
where
Bk,n =
[
−
n∑
s=1
gtk,s,i⊖jMk +DnMk − 2|gtk,n,i⊖j |Mk,−
n∑
s=1
gtk,s,i⊖jMk +DnMk
]
is a one-dimensional closed ball with radius ∆ = |gtk,n,i⊖j |Mk. Note that this
ball is fixed given ǫ−Ak . Since |gtk,s,i⊖j |Mk ≥ 1, we can apply Corollary 4.2.1
to get
P
(
n∑
s=1
ǫtk,sgtk,s,i⊖jMk ∈ Bk,n
∣∣∣∣∣ǫ−Ak
)
≤ CLO(∆ + 1)√
n
=
CLO(|gtk,n,i⊖j |Mk + 1)√
n
.
Now we continue the derivation,
|Ak|∑
n=1
|gtk,n,i⊖j |P
(
n∑
s=1
ǫtk,sgtk,s,i⊖jMk ∈ Bk,n
∣∣∣∣∣ǫ−Ak
)
≤
|Ak|∑
n=1
|gtk,n,i⊖j |
CLO(|gtk,n,i⊖j |Mk + 1)√
n
≤CLO

|Ak|∑
n=1
|gtk,n,i⊖j |2Mk√
n
+
|Ak|∑
n=1
2√
n

 .
Since we have |gtk,n,i⊖j | < T−
1
2k+1 , |gtk,n,i⊖j |2T
1
2k = |gtk,n,i⊖j |2Mk < 1. Thus
we have the bound,
CLO

|Ak|∑
n=1
|gtk,n,i⊖j |2Mk√
n
+
|Ak|∑
n=1
2√
n

 ≤ 3CLO |Ak|∑
n=1
1√
n
≤ 6CLO
√
|Ak|.
Case II: k = K. Similar to the previous case, we have
∑
t∈AK
|gt,i⊖j |P
(
t−1∑
τ=1
ǫτgτ,i⊖j ≥ −
t−1∑
τ=1
gτ,i⊖j,
t∑
τ=1
ǫτgτ,i⊖j ≤ −
t∑
τ=1
gτ,i⊖j
)
≤ sup
ǫ−AK
∑
t∈AK
|gt,i⊖j |EǫAk [1(∑t−1τ=1 ǫτgτ,i⊖j≥−∑t−1τ=1 gτ,i⊖j ,∑tτ=1 ǫτgτ,i⊖j≤−∑tτ=1 gτ,i⊖j)|ǫ−AK ]
and writing the elements of AK in increasing order as {tK,1, . . . , tK,|AK |}, we
get∑
t∈AK
|gt,i⊖j |EǫAK [1(∑t−1τ=1 ǫτgτ,i⊖j≥−∑t−1τ=1 gτ,i⊖j ,∑tτ=1 ǫτgτ,i⊖j≤−∑tτ=1 gτ,i⊖j)|ǫ−AK ]
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≤
|AK |∑
n=1
|gtK,n,i⊖j |P
(
n∑
s=1
ǫtK,sgtK,s,i⊖jMK ∈ BK,n
)
where
Dn = Dn(ǫ−AK ) = −
tK,n−1∑
τ=1,τ∈{−AK}
(1 + ǫτ )gτ,i⊖j,
MK = T
1
2K ≤ 2, and
BK,n =
[
−
n∑
s=1
gtK,s,i⊖jMK +DnMK − 2|gtK,n,i⊖j |MK ,−
n∑
s=1
gtK,s,i⊖jMK +DnMK
]
is a one-dimensional closed ball with radius ∆ = |gtK,n,i⊖j |MK . Note that this
ball is fixed given ǫ−AK and hence, we can apply Corollary 4.2.1 to get
|AK |∑
n=1
|gtK,n,i⊖j |P
(
n∑
s=1
ǫtK,sgtK,s,i⊖jMK ∈ BK,n
)
≤
|AK |∑
n=1
|gtK,n,i⊖j |
CLO(|gtK,n,i⊖j |MK + 1)√
n
≤CLO(4MK + 2)
|AK|∑
n=1
1√
n
≤ 20CLO
√
|AK |.
Combining the two cases proves the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 4.5. Consider a game with two strategies, i.e., N = 2. We
refer to player i as the “player” and the other players collectively as the “en-
vironment”. On odd rounds, the environment plays payoff vector (0, 0). This
ensures that after odd rounds, the environment will know exactly which strategy
the player will choose as long as there is no tie in the player’s sampled cumula-
tive payoffs, because no matter whether the Rademacher random variable is −1
or +1, the next strategy played will be the same as the strategy the player just
played. On even rounds t, the environment plays the payoff vector (0, 1− 0.1t)
if the player chose the first strategy in the previous round, and (1 − 0.1t, 0) if
the player chose the second strategy in the previous round. Under this scenario,
we make a critical observation that, as long as the set of sampled time points
is not empty, which happens with probability (12 )
t−1 on round t, there will not
be a tie in the cumulative payoffs of the two strategies. Moreover, without a
tie, the player will not be able to switch strategy on even rounds so will not
accumulate any payoff. Therefore, the total payoff acquired by the player by
following sampled fictitious play procedure will be at most
∑∞
t=1(
1
2 )
t−1 = 2.
However, as evident from the environment’s procedure, the total payoff for two
strategies is at least 0.45T and thus the best strategy has a payoff no less than
0.225T because of the pigeonhole principle. Hence, the expected regret for the
player is at least 0.225T − 2, which is linear in T .
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Supplementary Material for “Sampled Fictitious Play is
Hannan Consistent”
Appendix B Counterexample Showing Polyno-
mial N Dependence
In this section, we present a counterexample which shows that the sampled
fictitious play algorithm (2) with Bernoulli sampling (3) has a lower bound of
Ω(N) on its expected regret when T is 2N . This is consistent with a lower bound
for the expected regret of order Ω(
√
NT ). However, we are unable to extend
the construction to an arbitrary T . This counterexample is from [Warmuth,
2015] and we learned it in private communication with Manfred Warmuth and
Gergely Neu.
Theorem B.1 (Warmuth [2015]). The sampled fictitious play algorithm has
expected regret of Ω(N) when T is 2N and N →∞.
Proof. Consider the N × 2N payoff matrix:

0 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 . . .
−1 0 0 −1 −1 −1 . . .
−1 0 −1 0 0 −1 . . .
−1 0 −1 0 −1 0 . . .
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
−1 0 −1 0 −1 0 . . .


.
Each row represents a strategy and each column represents payoffs of the strate-
gies in a particular round. In the mth odd round, i.e., in the (2m−1)-th round,
the adversary assigns a payoff of −1 to all strategies except strategy m which
gets a payoff of 0. In the mth even round, i.e., the 2m-th round, the adversary
assigns a payoff of −1 to strategies 1 through m and a payoff of 0 to the others.
Note that, in all rounds after 2m, strategy m will always be given a payoff of
−1. Overall, we will have N strategies and 2N rounds, with the best constant
strategy being the last strategy which accumulates payoff of −N .
To analyze the expected regret, we consider even and odd rounds separately.
Note that as long as round 2m − 1 is picked in the sampled history, which
happens with probability 12 , the algorithm will not choose any strategy from
m+1 through N at round 2m. This is because they all have identical payoffs as
strategy m prior to round 2m−1, and strategy m looks better on round 2m−1.
So, the algorithm will pick a strategy from 1 through m on round 2m, all of
which acquire a gain of −1. Therefore, the algorithm will acquire an expected
payoff of at most − 12 on even rounds.
Next we consider odd rounds. On round 2m− 1, we observe that the leader
set (i.e., the argmin in (2)) either includes strategy m or not. If it includes
strategy m, it will additionally include strategies m + 1 through N as well
since they have had identical payoffs in the past. It may possibly also include
some strategies in the set {1, . . . ,m − 1}. Since the algorithm randomly picks
a strategy from the leader set, and all but one of them has a payoff of −1 on
round 2m − 1, the expected gain of the algorithm is at most − N−m
N−m+1 . If the
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leader set does not include strategy m, then the expected gain is exactly −1
since strategym is the only one with zero payoff at round 2m−1. Therefore, the
algorithm will acquire an expected payoff of at most − N−m
N−m+1 on even rounds.
Hence, the expected regret of Sampled Fictitious Play under this scenario
with N strategies and 2N rounds is at least, for some c > 0,
RT ≥ −N −
(
−
N∑
m=1
(
N −m
N −m+ 1)−
N
2
)
≥ N
2
− c log(N) = Ω(N).
Appendix C Asymmetric Probabilities
In this section we prove that for binary payoff and arbitrary α ∈ (0, 1) insead
of just 1/2, the expected regret is O(
√
T ) where the constant hidden in O(·)
notation blows up in either of the two extreme case: α→ 0 and α→ 1. Note that
we are still considering the single stream version (4) of the learning procedure.
Theorem C.1. For α ∈ (0, 1) and gt ∈ {−1, 0, 1}N, assuming that T >
max( 21−α ,
2
α
), the expected regret satisfies
E [RT ] ≤ 40N
2Qα
α
√
T
where Qα =
e
2π ×
√
2
α(1−α) .
Proof. We begin with the inequality obtained in the proof of Theorem 4.1:
E [RT ] ≤ N
2
α
max
1≤i,j≤N
T∑
t=1
|gt,i⊖j |P
(
G˜t−1,i⊖j ≥ 0, G˜t,i⊖j ≤ 0
)
. (5)
As before, we fix i and j, and will bound the expression
T∑
t=1
|gt,i⊖j |P (
t−1∑
τ=1
(1 + ǫτ )gτ,i⊖j ≥ 0,
t∑
τ=1
(1 + ǫτ )gτ,i⊖j ≤ 0).
The rest of the proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 4.4. Define the classes
Ak = {t : gt,i⊖j = k, t = 1, . . . , T } for k ∈ {−2,−1, 1, 2}. We have,
T∑
t=1
|gt,i⊖j |P
(
t−1∑
τ=1
(1 + ǫτ )gτ,i⊖j ≥ 0,
t∑
τ=1
(1 + ǫτ )gτ,i⊖j ≤ 0
)
≤2
T∑
t=1
P
(
t−1∑
τ=1
ǫτgτ,i⊖j ≥ −
t−1∑
τ=1
gτ,i⊖j ,
t∑
τ=1
ǫτgτ,i⊖j ≤ −
t∑
τ=1
gτ,i⊖j
)
=2
∑
k∈{−2,−1,1,2}
∑
t∈Ak
P
(
t−1∑
τ=1
ǫτgτ,i⊖j ≤ −
t−1∑
τ=1
gτ,i⊖j,
t∑
τ=1
ǫsgτ,i⊖j ≤ −
t∑
τ=1
gτ,i⊖j
)
.
For any k ∈ {−2,−1, 1, 2},
∑
t∈Ak
P
(
t−1∑
τ=1
ǫτgτ,i⊖j ≥ −
t−1∑
τ=1
gτ,i⊖j ,
t∑
τ=1
ǫτgτ,i⊖j ≤ −
t∑
τ=1
gτ,i⊖j
)
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≤ sup
ǫ−Ak
∑
t∈Ak
EǫAk
[1∑t−1
τ=1 ǫτgτ,i⊖j≥−
∑t−1
τ=1 gτ,i⊖j ,
∑
t
τ=1 ǫτgτ,i⊖j≤−
∑
t
τ=1 gτ,i⊖j
|ǫ−Ak ].
Let Ak = {tk,1, . . . , tk,|Ak|} with elements listed in increasing order of time
index. Also define, for n ∈ {1, . . . , |Ak|},
Dn = Dn(ǫ−Ak) = −
tk,n−1∑
τ=1,τ∈{−Ak}
ǫτgτ,i⊖j −
tk,n−1∑
τ=1,τ∈{−Ak}
gτ,i⊖j .
We then proceed as follows.∑
t∈Ak
EǫAk
[1∑t−1
τ=1 ǫτgτ,i⊖j≥−
∑t−1
τ=1 gτ,i⊖j ,
∑
t
τ=1 ǫτgτ,i⊖j≤−
∑
t
τ=1 gτ,i⊖j
|ǫ−Ak ]
=
|Ak|∑
n=1
EǫAk
[1(
∑n−1
s=1 ǫtk,sgtk,s,i⊖j≥−
∑n−1
s=1 gtk,s,i⊖j+Dn,
∑
n
s=1 ǫtk,sgs,i⊖j≤−
∑
n
s=1 gtk,s,i⊖j+Dn)
|ǫ−Ak ]
=
|Ak|∑
n=1
P
(
n−1∑
s=1
ǫtk,sgtk,s,i⊖j ≥ −
n−1∑
s=1
gtk,s,i⊖j +Dn,
n∑
s=1
ǫtk,sgtk,s,i⊖j ≤ −
n∑
s=1
gtk,s,i⊖j +Dn
∣∣∣∣∣ǫ−Ak
)
≤
|Ak|∑
n=1
P
(
4⋃
u=0
(
n∑
s=1
ǫtk,sgtk,s,i⊖j = −
n−1∑
s=1
gtk,s,i⊖j +Dn − u)
∣∣∣∣∣ǫ−Ak
)
≤
|Ak|∑
n=1
(
4∑
u=0
P
(
n∑
s=1
ǫtk,sgtk,s,i⊖j = −
n−1∑
s=1
gtk,s,i⊖j +Dn − u
∣∣∣∣∣ǫ−Ak
))
≤5
|Ak|∑
n=1
Qα√
n
≤ 10Qα
√
|Ak|
where Qα =
e
2π ×
√
2
α(1−α) from Lemma A.2. Putthing things together, we have
E [RT ] ≤ 20N
2Qα
α
∑
k∈{−2,−1,1,2}
√
|Ak| ≤ 40N
2Qα
α
√
T .
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